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Despite progress in reducing stockpiles after the end of the Cold War, the disturbing 
actions of some nations could spread nuclear weapon capabilities and enlarge 
existing arsenals. 
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he first nuclear weapon explosion, code-
named Trinity, took place at Alamogordo, 
New Mexico, on 16 July 1945. Since then 
eight countries have carried out more than 
2000 nuclear tests with yields from a fraction 
of a kiloton to some 50 megatons. (Yield is the 
amount of TNT needed for an equivalent explosion.) 
The public anxiety over nuclear testing began 
shortly after World War II, as the powerful but pol­
luting atmospheric explosions exposed entire com­
munities, known as downwinders, to the health 
hazards of radioactive fallout. Governmental anxi­
ety followed in the late 1950s, and the US, USSR, and 
UK entered a moratorium on nuclear testing, only 
to have it fall apart three years later when the French 
began testing and the three countries resumed test­
ing ever more powerful weapons with a vengeance. 
In 1963, three years after President John F. 
Kennedy warned the public that as many as 20 coun­
tries might obtain nuclear capabilities by the end of 
the decade, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) was 
negotiated to help curb the spread. That treaty pro­
hibits testing in the atmosphere, under water, and 
in outer space, but not underground. Satellite sur­
veillance and seismology were both very new at the 
time, and effective verification of a ban on under­
ground explosions was widely thought impossible 
without onsite inspections, which were not part 
of the LTBT. Nonetheless, in 1968 the international 
commitment to comprehensively end nuclear test­
ing was reaffirmed in another agreement, the Nu­
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
The NPT was built on a strategic bargain: The 
overwhelming majority of countries agreed to join 
the treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states, to not ac­
quire nuclear weapons, and to allow inspections of 
their nuclear facilities. In return, the five nuclear 
weapon states—the US, UK, and USSR (now Russia), 
later joined by China and France and collectively 
known as the P5—pledged to work toward the elim­
ination of their nuclear arsenals and to allow the 
sharing of peaceful nuclear technology with the 
non-nuclear-weapon states.1 
At the time, the NPT signatories understood 
that the total elimination of all nuclear weapons was 
likely to be far in the future. Nearly half a century 
later, that’s still the case. But India, Pakistan, Israel, 
and North Korea are not parties to the NPT, and 
dealing with their capabilities and those of the P5 
proceeds in parallel with efforts involving the non­
nuclear NPT parties. Figure 1 outlines the history of 
nuclear weapon proliferation since the first test in 
1945. The US and USSR–Russia stockpiles have each 
declined by almost an order of magnitude from 
their peaks; the UK and French stockpiles have 
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 modestly declined. For others, either the picture is 
uncertain or the numbers are increasing. 
If Iran were to build the bomb, in violation of 
its NPT obligations, how would NPT non-nuclear­
weapon states, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, 
react? If the US, China, or Russia were to resume 
nuclear testing, would that lead to testing by others 
and to new deployments of nuclear weapons? The 
NPT “regime” extends beyond the treaty in numer­
ous ways to help counter those and other risks. 
Tools such as diplomacy between nations, arms con-
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Figure 1. Nuclear weapons, counted. The 
approximate number of stockpiled weapons in 
each country is keyed to the date of its first nuclear 
test. (Adapted from data of Hans Kristensen, 
http://www.fas.org.) The following are 2013 totals: 
US, 4650 stockpiled, 2120 operational; Russia, 4300 
stockpiled, 1600 operational; UK, 225; France, 300; 
China, 250; India, 90–110; Pakistan, 100–120; and 
North Korea (DPRK), 5–10. 
trol, economic sanctions, safeguards and protocols 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
physical security for nuclear materials and weapons, 
counterproliferation military strikes, port and bor­
der security, limits on the production of weapons­
useable uranium and plutonium, and the Prolif ­
eration Security Initiative—a global effort to stop 
trafficking in weapons of mass destruction—are all 
part of the broader regime. That interconnected 
system must be resilient to unpredictable changes. 
Further nuclear testing or withdrawal by a nation 
from the NPT would pose serious challenges to 
the regime. 
In November 2013 two dozen experts spoke at 
a short course, cosponsored by the American Phys­
ical Society’s Forum on Physics and Society and the 
George Washington University’s Elliott School of In­
ternational Affairs, to discuss those and other current 
threats to international security posed by nuclear 
weapons and related technologies.2 This article fo­
cuses on the NPT and national security—particularly 
as both are affected by the legal status of the closely 
linked Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) and the ongoing developments in Iran and 
other nations. 
The NPT–CTBT intersection 
International law is not domestic law. Enforcement 
of international nonproliferation agreements in­
cludes measures decided by the UN Security Coun­
cil. But those measures are effective only if most of 
the global community of nations adhere to them. 
Unfortunately, confidence in the NPT has been com­
plicated by the fact that the CTBT, opened for sig­
nature in 1996, has yet to enter into force—that is, 
be ratified into law by China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, 
India, Pakistan, North Korea, and the US. (See the 
article by Jeremiah Sullivan, PHYSICS TODAY, March 
1998, page 24.) 
The holdouts are troubling. For one thing, there 
is broad international support for the CTBT: The 
treaty has been signed by 183 states, has been ratified 
by 162, and bans nuclear tests at any yield, at any 
place, and for all time. For another, during negotia­
tions to secure a permanent extension of the NPT, 
France, Russia, the UK, and the US sent a letter, dated 
19 April 1995 (China later agreed), to the NPT Review 
and Extension Conference promising a CTBT:1 
We reaffirm our determination to con­
tinue to negotiate intensively, as a high 
priority, a universal and multilaterally 
and effectively verifiable comprehen­
sive nuclear test-ban treaty, and we 
pledge our support for its conclusion 
without delay. . . . We  call upon all 
States parties to the [NPT] to make the 
treaty provisions permanent. This will 
be crucial for the full realization of the 
goals set out in Article VI. 
In 1999, when the US Senate considered giving its 
advice and consent to ratification, it declined to do 
so. In the hearings and floor debate, the verifiability 
of the treaty and the effectiveness of the US nuclear 
weapons stockpile in the absence of nuclear-explosive 
testing were principal issues cited as problematic. 
The contention caused by the failure of the US and 
the other seven states to ratify the CTBT does not 
help develop the global consensus needed to en­
force nonproliferation undertakings. Without the 
CTBT, the NPT is perceived as a treaty of unbal­
anced obligations. 
A ban on nuclear tests is a nonproliferation and 
arms-control measure that raises the barrier for 
states to move toward nuclear weapons and blocks 
existing nuclear powers from substantial new tech­
nical advances. Although such a barrier would not 
prevent the development of simple gun-type 
weapons, which typically do not require testing 
to work, it prevents development of thermonuclear 
weapons and the miniaturization of nuclear weapons 
for missiles.3 
At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, all 189 
NPT members viewed the CTBT’s entry into force 
as essential for a strengthened nonproliferation 
regime. In December 2013 the United Nations Gen­
eral Assembly urged all nations to sign and ratify 
the CTBT on a vote of 181 yes, 1 no (North Korea), 
and 3 abstentions (India, Mauritius, Syria). The 
Obama administration has declared its support for 
Senate action to ratify the treaty. 
Seismic monitoring 
Since 1963, when the LTBT was adopted, the capa­
bilities of seismology to detect underground nuclear 
explosions have steadily improved. By the time the 
CTBT was negotiated at the Geneva Conference on 
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Figure 2. Seismic spectrographs taken in Mudanjiang, 
China, record the ground-velocity amplitudes of three 
events a few hundred kilometers away in North Korea: a 
9 October 2006 nuclear test (top) of magnitude 4 (0.7 kt 
equivalent yield); a 16 December 2004 magnitude 4 earth­
quake (middle); and a 19 August 1998 underground 
chemical explosion (bottom; 0.002 kt equivalent yield). The 
nuclear and chemical explosions cause the sudden onset 
of compressive waves that travel either through the crust 
and mantle (Pn) or through the crust alone (Pg) and the later 
onset of weak shear waves (Sn and Lg) and Rayleigh waves,
a type of surface wave. Compressive waves in earthquakes 
emerge more slowly and their shear waves are stronger than 
in the explosions; indeed, the shear waves are so weak in 
both nuclear and chemical explosions that labelling their 
emergence in spectra is difficult. (Adapted from ref. 11.) 
Disarmament in the mid 1990s, seismic instru ­
mentation had matured so dramatically that it and 
other test-detection technologies provided a very 
effective means to verify states’ compliance with the 
new treaty. 
The CTBT establishes the International Monitor­
ing System (IMS), networks comprising 321 seismic, 
radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasound sen­
sors around the world—84% of them certified, 5% in­
stalled, 6% in construction, and 5% planned. Thanks 
to the relatively high density of the 170-station seis­
mic network, states have access to a richer set of data 
than was possible when the LTBT was negotiated, 
when there was no regular access to territories of 
states of interest, particularly the USSR. The seismic 
network can detect explosions at more reduced 
yield levels than previously. “National technical 
means”—the nationally owned and operated seis­
mic and other sensors, reconnaissance satellites, 
ships, and aircraft—provide an additional and pow­
erful source of verification that exceeds the capabil­
ity of the IMS networks. 
Regional and long-range seismic waves are 
used to distinguish between explosions and earth­
quakes, estimate the magnitude of an event, and 
determine its location so that follow-up onsite in­
spections can be carried out in ambiguous cases. 
Consider figure 2, which compares seismograms 
from a low-magnitude earthquake, a chemical ex­
plosion, and the 9 October 2006 nuclear explosion 
in North Korea. The nuclear test was detected 
widely by the IMS and other stations in South 
Korea, China, and Japan. A later North Korean nu­
clear explosion, on 12 February 2013, was detected 
by 96 IMS stations, which were able to locate the test 
site to within 8 km. 
Regional waves predominantly travel through 
Earth’s crust and upper mantle and are strongly af­
fected by local geology, which can complicate inter­
pretation, but they offer better, more detailed results 
than long-range waves. In 2001 seismologists Vitaly 
Khalturin, Tanya Rautian, and Paul Richards ana­
lyzed the regional signals collected between 1961 
and 1989 at distances 500–1500 km from under­
ground explosions at the former Soviet test site at 
Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan. Usefully detailed seis­
mic information was found in the old Soviet data 
from all but two of 340 tests with yields over a ton.4 
Newer broadband seismographs are suffi­
ciently sensitive that, according to a 2002 National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) study,5 underground 
nuclear explosions conducted in hard rock anywhere 
in Europe, Asia, North Africa, and North America 
can be reliably detected and identified as explosions 
down to a yield of 0.1 kt using IMS data. The denser 
the seismic network in a particular region, the 
greater the detection probability. A 2012 National Re­
search Council (NRC) report has mapped the mag­
nitudes and yields that a nuclear test anywhere in 
the world would have to exceed in order to be de­
tected.6 As shown in figure 3, explosions well below 
a kiloton can be detected with 90% confidence. 
The probability that a state seeking to violate 
the CTBT can repeatedly evade detection drops rap­
idly with an increased number of tests. Additionally, 
geophysicists Ola Dahlman, Svein Mykkeltveit, and 
Hein Haak point out7 that the violator would have 
to reduce its test explosion’s yield by a factor of three 
to reduce the seismic detection probability from 
90% to 10%. Further compounding the risk of being 
detected, violators must take into account the syn­
ergy provided by other IMS networks, possible on-
site inspections, possible excess yields, and informa­
tion available from the thousands of seismic stations 
operated by academic and disaster-preparedness 
organizations to monitor earthquakes. 
One evasion scenario, envisioned in the 1950s, 
is “cavity decoupling”—the use of a cave or under­
ground cavity intended to muffle the seismic waves 
from a nuclear explosion and thus reduce the radi­
ated signal. Even in that case, according to the 2012 
NRC report, “an evasive tester in Asia, Europe, 
North Africa, or North America would need to re­
strict device yield to levels below 1 kiloton (even if 
the explosion were fully decoupled) to ensure no 
more than a 10 percent probability of detection for 
IMS and open monitoring networks” (page 10).6 
And that doesn’t account for the deterrent provided 
by states’ national technical means and from the 
IMS network of radionuclide sensors. 
Iran’s centrifuges 
To build a nuclear weapon, one must first produce 
the fissile material that powers it. Historically, the 
most common path to that end was to extract plu­
tonium from the spent fuel rods of heavy-water re­
actors that used natural uranium. That method was 
India’s path to its 1974 test explosion. A less common 
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approach was to enrich uranium to increase the 
abundance of its fissile isotope 235U. Uranium en­
richment was difficult with bulky gaseous diffusion 
technology, and active diplomacy convinced several 
nations in the 1970s to abandon plans for reprocess­
ing spent fuel. 
Thirty years later, centrifuge technology has 
advanced sufficiently that it is now the chosen path 
for acquiring highly enriched, bomb-grade ura­
nium. Because gas centrifuges require much less 
power and space than reactors and reprocessing 
plants, they are much easier to hide. And their 
growing use represents a challenge: how to prevent 
the development of nuclear weapons and still allow 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Both goals are 
part of the NPT. (See the article by Houston Wood, 
Alexander Glaser, and Scott Kemp, PHYSICS TODAY, 
September 2008, page 40.) 
The enrichment of uranium is measured in 
separative work units (SWUs) and is a nonlinear 
process. A common light water reactor (LWR) pro­
ducing about a gigawatt of electric power consumes 
each year approximately 25 tons of 3.75%-enriched 
fuel, obtained from 210 tons of natural uranium, and 
requires 120 000 SWU. Figure 4 offers an example of 
the extent to which the separative work diminishes 
as uranium is enriched from its natural form of 0.7% 
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Figure 3. The detection capability of the International Monitoring 
System’s seismic network is correlated to the magnitude of Earth’s
seismic events. In 2007, when this map was made, the primary network 
consisted of 38 stations (dots and triangles) around the world. The 
map’s colors correlate the minimum seismic magnitude to the explosive 
yield in kilotons in hard rock required for 90%-confidence-level 
detection. For example, one can be 90% sure of detecting any tests 
above 0.09 kt in Asia, Europe, and North Africa for tamped explosions 
in hard rock with better propagation, and 0.22 kt in rock with poorer 
propagation. If the confidence level is relaxed to 10% detection, the 
yields are reduced by a factor of three. (Adapted from ref. 6, courtesy 
of Tormod Kvaerna and Frode Ringdal.) 
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235U, to its highly (90%) enriched form. It requires 
about 800 SWU per ton of uranium to make 130 kg 
of 4%-enriched reactor fuel. An additional 300 SWU 
yields 26 kg of 20% highly enriched uranium, and a 
further 200 SWU yields 5.6 kg of 90% HEU. Put an­
other way, it takes about 60% of the total work to 
produce low-enriched LWR fuel, 25% of the total to 
enrich the fuel to 20%, and another 15% of the total 
to raise that amount to 90%. Thus, a stockpile of 20% 
enriched material can significantly reduce the time 
a country requires to make a nuclear weapon. 
Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Germany, 
India, Iran, Japan, the Netherlands, North Korea, 
Pakistan, Russia, the UK, and the US currently en­
rich uranium. Commercially enriched stock is
primarily supplied by Europe’s URENCO (10 mil­
lion SWU/year), Russia’s Rosatom (26 million), and 
France’s AREVA (10 million). Iran’s centrifuges pro­
duce 0.8–4 SWU/year,8 and the country has claimed 
the right to pursue uranium enrichment in line with 
the NPT. But its claim has been a subject of dispute, 
considering that Iran had not reported its past en­
richment activities to the IAEA. The developments 
have prompted condemnation in UN Security Coun­
cil resolutions. Other nonweapon states that enrich 
uranium have negotiated acceptable reporting and 
inspection agreements with the IAEA. 
Figure 5 shows the growing numbers of cen­
trifuges Iran has installed and is operating at its 
large facility in Natanz since 2007. (To date, Natanz 
and the other main centrifuge facility, at Fordow, to­
gether house 19 000 centrifuges.)  
P5 plus 1 
An agreement known as the Joint Plan of Action be­
tween Iran and the P5 (plus Germany) took effect on 
20 January 2014. In the agreement, which will last 
six months, Iran allows constraints to be placed on 
its nuclear program in exchange for a reduction of 
$7 billion in economic sanctions. The agreement ap­
proximately doubles the “breakout time” needed to 
obtain sufficient HEU to build a nuclear weapon; 
the IAEA counts 25 kg of 90% HEU as a “significant 
quantity,” sufficient for a weapon. 
According to the plan,9 Iran agrees to halt ura­
nium enrichment above 5% and cap the production 
of 3.5%-enriched uranium; dilute or oxidize the 
country’s near-20%-enriched stock; stop the instal­
lation of additional centrifuges at Natanz, Fordow, 
and elsewhere; freeze advances at the country’s 
heavy-water reactor in Arak; allow monthly verifi­
cation inspections of the reactor and daily inspec­
tions of the Natanz and Fordow facilities; provide 
access to centrifuges, production facilities, uranium 
mines, and mills; and notify the IAEA in a timely 
manner about any new nuclear facilities. 
The primary goal of the constraints is to main­
tain at least a six-month breakout time so that the 
UN can respond well before Iran can make suffi­
cient weapons-grade uranium if the country re­
neges on the agreement. Detection of the production 
of uranium enriched over 5% would be a violation 
of the joint agreement. David Albright, president of 
the nonprofit Institute for Science and International 
Security, and colleagues calculate a breakout time of 
www.physicstoday.org 
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ceipts can be audited. Environmental samples of 
soil and water can be obtained in and outside a 
plant. Unannounced inspections are useful to detect 
undeclared material and operations. 
The IAEA and the US have had considerable ex­
perience in nuclear monitoring. The technology 
used to monitor the “blend-down” of 500 tons of 
Russian HEU to reactor fuel is instructive. The den­
sity of 235U in the uranium hexafluoride gas can be 
determined by measuring the emission of 186-keV 
gamma rays from the uranium. And the transmis­
sion of 122-keV gamma rays from cobalt-57 through 
the UF6 gas determines total uranium density. The 
ratio of the two values yields the enrichment level. 
Twenty years of monitoring by Oak Ridge and Los 
Alamos (LANL) National Laboratories have veri­
fied the dilution of Russian HEU in the equivalent 
of 20 000 HEU warheads. 
Confidence in untested nuclear weapons 
The enduring US stockpile consists of several types 
of warheads; they include tactical and strategic 
bombs and land- and submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles. The US has not tested any of them since 
1992. The directors of LANL, Lawrence Livermore 
(LLNL), and Sandia National Laboratories have 
concluded that nuclear-explosive testing is not 
needed to resolve technical issues concerning the US 
nuclear stockpile. 
At the November 2013 short course,2 Texas 
A&M University’s Marvin Adams surveyed the US 
Stockpile Stewardship Program and agreed with a 
central conclusion from the NRC’s 2012 report (ref­
erence 6, page 1): 
Provided that sufficient resources and a 
national commitment to stockpile stew­
ardship are in place, the committee 
judges that the United States has the 
technical capabilities to maintain a safe, 
secure, and reliable stockpile of nuclear 
weapons into the foreseeable future 
without nuclear-explosion testing. . . .  
Sustaining those technical capabilities 
will require . . . :  
‣ a strong science and engineering base. . . ;  
‣ a vigorous surveillance program; 
‣	 adequate ratio of performance margins 
to uncertainties; 
‣ modernized production facilities; and 
‣ a competent and capable work force. 
Stockpile stewardship assesses the status of 
warheads, including the impact of changes made to 
them, and takes any needed actions to maintain 
near certainty that weapons would meet require­
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Figure 4. The effort required to enrich uranium and increase the 
concentration of its fissile isotope 235U diminishes exponentially as the 
concentration rises. The effort is measured in separative work units. 
Starting with 1 ton of natural uranium, it takes 800 SWU to produce 
4%-enriched reactor fuel, an additional 300 SWU to produce 
20%-enriched material for research reactors, and 200 more SWU 
to produce 90%-enriched material. (Courtesy of Olli Heinonen.) 
ments if used. (See the article by Raymond Jeanloz, 
PHYSICS TODAY, December 2000, page 44.) That as­
sessment, in practice, translates into monitoring the 
warheads, repairing any observed degradation, dis­
mantling retired warheads (now about 250 per 
year), and extending the life of the remaining stock­
piled weapons. 
Scientists at LANL and LLNL have determined 
a lower limit of 85 to 100 years for the lifetime of a 
plutonium “pit,” the part associated with the fission 
stage of a nuclear explosive. The JASONs, a group 
of technical experts who advise the Defense Depart­
ment, agreed with that assessment. One may simply 
reuse the plutonium-based pit when a weapon’s life 
is extended. However, long-term stockpile steward­
ship requires the ability to manufacture new pits. 
Currently the Los Alamos Pit Production Facility 
fulfills that role and can produce 6–10 pits per year; 
further investment could boost its production to as 
many as 80 pits per year. 
Modifications in the warheads are being consid­
ered to enhance their safety, security, and perfor ­
mance margins as part of upcoming life-extension 
programs (LEPs); see PHYSICS TODAY, December 
2013, page 26. According to Adams, the actions 
being considered in LEPs can include refurbishing 
existing warheads, reusing the nuclear components 
from different warheads, and replacing nuclear 
components with designs not previously in the 
stockpile. All LEPs require some manufacturing, 
and any change in a weapon requires the assess­
ment of experts familiar with the latest advances in 
experiments, theory, and computation. Opportuni­
ties to introduce changes are relatively rare because 
LEPs are carried out on a multidecade time scale. 
The following points summarize developments 
in stockpile stewardship since the NAS’s 2002 CTBT 
study was carried out: 
‣ LEPs are a reality, successfully carried out for 
land- and submarine-based warheads. 
‣ Peta-scale computation is now available to aid 
design, stewardship, and understanding of a 
weapon’s behavior. 
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Figure 5. The number of Iran’s centrifuges at Natanz (a) in 2013 grew 
to nearly 16 000, a roughly 60% increase from the previous year. 
Combined with the number at a smaller facility in Fordow, the country 
currently has a total of 19 000 centrifuges. Operable centrifuges (black) 
are enriching uranium hexafluoride. Inoperable centrifuges (green) 
include installed machines not yet fed with UF6 and a large fraction 
damaged by sabotage in 2009 and 2010 when the computer virus 
Stuxnet infected the operating system. The plateau in late 2013 may be 
related to the negotiations between Iran and the P5-plus-1 (the US, UK, 
Russia, China, France, and Germany). (Plot courtesy of David Albright.) 
(b) Then-president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inspects the Natanz nuclear 
plant on 8 March 2007. (Photo courtesy of EPA/Landov.) 
‣ The National Ignition Facility and Dual-Axis Ra­
diographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility have been 
completed for studying relevant physics. 
‣ The future of the Chemistry and Metallurgy 
Research Replacement Facility at LANL and the 
Uranium Production Facility at the Department of 
Energy’s Y-12 National Security Complex at Oak 
Ridge are in doubt because of cost. 
Although the NAS and NRC panels concluded 
that the US can maintain a reliable stockpile without 
nuclear-explosive testing, the stewardship pro­
gram’s future success isn’t guaranteed. The biggest 
concern is the ability to attract, develop, and retain 
a first-class work force. Adams urges several steps: 
Professionals in the US should be involved with 
related nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and sci­
ence issues to maintain their expertise and skills. The 
weapons labs should continue to maintain first-rate 
facilities, some for unclassified work. Experts out­
side the weapons facilities can provide helpful as­
sessments, as it is difficult to assess quality “from the 
inside.” The gaps in understanding of weapons’ be­
havior can be addressed with ongoing experiment, 
theory, simulation, and analysis of past data. 
Final thoughts 
There’s a highly compelling reason the US and other 
nuclear-weapon-possessing states don’t test nuclear 
weapons: To do so would not only invite a new arms 
race, it would make addressing the nuclear pro­
grams in Iran and North Korea much harder and 
put the nonproliferation regime at risk. 
India and Pakistan are examples of what hap­
pens in the absence of an arms-control agreement. 
Both countries have roughly the same nuclear capa­
bility and are continuing to build larger and more 
sophisticated arsenals. International efforts to deal 
with their competition have not led to a halt, let 
alone a reversal. A 2006 agreement between India 
and the US gives India more flexibility on nuclear 
imports. And the US war in Afghanistan loosened 
international pressure on Pakistan’s nuclear pro­
grams. One can hope that at least for the near 
term, the development of confidence- and security-
building measures will give diplomacy time to pre­
vent a nuclear crisis. 
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